Agreement plays a central role in distributed systems working on a common task. The increasing size of modern distributed systems makes them more susceptible to single component failures. Fault-tolerant distributed agreement protocols rely for the most part on leader-based atomic broadcast algorithms, such as Paxos. Such protocols are mostly used for data replication, which requires only a small number of servers to reach agreement. Yet, their centralized nature makes them ill-suited for distributed agreement at large scales. The recently introduced atomic broadcast algorithm ALLCONCUR enables high throughput for distributed agreement while being completely decentralized. In this paper, we extend the work on ALLCONCUR in two ways. First, we provide a formal specification of ALLCONCUR that enables a better understanding of the algorithm. Second, we formally prove ALLCONCUR's safety property on the basis of this specification. Therefore, our work not only ensures operators safe usage of ALLCONCUR, but also facilitates the further improvement of distributed agreement protocols based on ALLCONCUR.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed systems working on a common task often have a shared state. Typically, the ordering of updates to this shared state is relevant, i.e. only identical ordering guarantees identical resulting states. Thus, to ensure identical distributed states, distributed agreement is required. Both for systems handling critical data and very large systems, the ability to sustain failures is crucial. For the former, inconsistencies are unacceptable, for the latter, failures become so common, that the lack of fault tolerance becomes a performance issue. Atomic broadcast algorithms enable fault-tolerant distributed agreement.
In this paper we formally specify ALLCONCUR [25] , a protocol that provides distributed agreement through a leaderless concurrent atomic broadcast algorithm under the assumption of partial synchrony ( II-B). ALLCONCUR 1 enables decentralized distributed agreement among a group of servers that communicate over an overlay network described by a sparse digraph. Moreover, it requires subquadratic work per server for every agreement instance and it significantly reduces the expected agreement time by employing an early termination mechanism. ALLCONCUR's specification is based on the original description of the protocol ( III). In addition, we provide a mechanically verifiable proof of ALLCONCUR's safety ( IV); the proof follows the steps of the informal proof described in the original paper [25] .
A. Related work and motivation
Atomic broadcast plays a central role in fault-tolerant distributed systems; for instance, it enables the implementation of both state machine replication [27] , [13] and distributed agreement [25] , [29] . As a result, the atomic broadcast problem sparked numerous proposals for algorithms [8] . Many of the proposed algorithms rely on a distinguished server (i.e., a leader) to provide total order; yet, the leader may become a bottleneck, especially at large scale. As an alternative, total order can be achieved by destinations agreement [8] , [5] , [25] . On the one hand, destinations agreement enables decentralized atomic broadcast algorithms; on the other hand, it entails agreement on the set of delivered messages and, thus, it requires consensus.
Most consensus algorithms and implementations are leader-based [14] , [15] , [17] , [22] , [3] , [24] , [4] , [6] ; thus, one server is on the critical path for all communication. Several attempts were made to increase performance by adopting a multi-leader approach [21] , [18] , [19] . Still, such approaches assume the overlay network is described by a complete digraph, i.e., each server can send messages to any other server. In general, leader-based consensus algorithms are intended for data replication, where the number of replicas (i.e., servers) are bounded by the required level of data reliability [24] . Distributed agreement has no such bound-the number of agreeing servers is an input parameter and it can be in the range of thousands or more. Thus, solutions that rely (for communication) on a complete digraph are not suitable for distributed agreement.
ALLCONCUR provides leaderless consensus and, thus, leaderless atomic broadcast, by using (as overlay network) any digraph with a vertex-connectivity exceeding the maximum number of tolerated failures. The original paper provides both a detailed
• (Validity) If a non-faulty server A-broadcasts m, then it eventually A-delivers m.
• (Agreement) If a non-faulty server A-delivers m, then all non-faulty servers eventually A-deliver m.
• (Integrity) For any message m, every non-faulty server A-delivers m at most once, and only if m was previously Abroadcast by sender (m).
• (Total order) If two non-faulty servers p and q A-deliver messages m 1 and m 2 , then p A-delivers m 1 before m 2 , if and only if q A-delivers m 1 before m 2 . Integrity and total order are safety properties; validity and agreement are liveness property ( III-D). If validity, agreement and integrity hold, the broadcast is reliable [11] , [5] . We consider reliable broadcast algorithms that use (as overlay networks) digraphs with the vertex-connectivity exceeding f ; thus, despite any f failures, the servers remain connected. Moreover, we consider atomic broadcast algorithms that provide total order through destinations agreement [8] -all non-faulty servers reach consensus on the set of messages to be A-delivered in a deterministic order.
In a synchronous round-based model [2, Chapter 2], consensus requires (in the worst case) at least f + 1 rounds [1] . Clearly, if G is used as overlay network, consensus requires (in the worst case) f + D f (G, f ) rounds, where D f (G, f ) denotes G's fault diameter-G's diameter after removing any f nodes [12] . Yet, always assuming the worst case is inefficient: It is very unlikely for the number of rounds to exceed D f (G, f ), if the mean time between failures is long compared to the length of rounds [25] .
B. ALLCONCUR
We consider ALLCONCUR [25] -a leaderless concurrent atomic broadcast algorithm that adopts a novel early termination mechanism to avoid assuming always the worst case. ALLCONCUR is round-based: In every round, every server A-broadcasts a (possibly empty) message and then A-delivers all known messages in a deterministic order. Since a synchronous model is impractical, while an asynchronous model makes solving consensus impossible [9] , ALLCONCUR assumes the following model of partial synchrony-message delays can be approximated by a known distribution [25] . Under this assumption, a heartbeat-based failure detector (FD) [5] -every server sends heartbeats to its successors and, if it fails, the successors detects the lack of heartbeats-can be treated (with a certain probability) as a perfect FD. Specifically, completeness (i.e., all failures are eventually detected) is deterministically guaranteed, while accuracy (i.e., no server is falsely suspected to have failed) is probabilistically guaranteed [25] .
ALLCONCUR's early termination mechanism uses failure notifications to track A-broadcast messages. Every server maintains a tracking digraph for every A-broadcast message. The nodes of a tracking digraph are the servers suspected to have the Abroadcast message, while the edges indicate the suspicion of how the message was transmitted. To stop tracking an A-broadcast message, a server must either receive the message or suspect only failed servers to have the message. A server can safely A-deliver its known messages once it stops tracking all A-broadcast messages ( IV).
The early termination mechanism relies on the following proposition: Proposition 1. If a non-faullty server receives an A-broadcast message and, subsequently, reliably broadcasts a failure notification, any other non-faulty server receives the A-broadcast message prior to the failure notification.
The reason Proposition 1 holds is twofold: (1) a non-faulty server sends further (to its successors) any message it receives for the first time; and (2) message order is preserved by both edges and nodes.
To illustrate the early termination mechanism we consider an example similar to the one in the ALLCONCUR paper [25] : n = 9 servers (p 0 , . . . , p 8 ) connected through a G S (n, d) digraph [28] with d = 3 the digraph's degree (see Figure 1a) . The digraph is regular and optimally connected [20] , i.e., the vertex-connectivity equals the degree; hence, f = 2. Figure 1b shows the changes to the tracking digraph used by p 6 to track p 0 's message m 0 under the following failure scenario: p 0 fails after sending m 0 only to p 5 , which receives m 0 , but fails without sending it further. When p 6 receives the first notification of p 0 's failure, for example originating from p 4 , it adds to the digraph all of p 0 's successors except for p 4 , the sender of the notification-p 6 suspects that, before p 0 failed, it sent m 0 to all its successors, except p 4 , which could not have received m 0 from p 0 . Had p 4 received m 0 from p 0 , then m 0 would have arrived to p 6 before the failure notification (cf. Proposition 1). Also, p 6 tracks m 0 until it only suspects failed servers to have it; only then is p 6 sure no non-faulty server has m 0 and stops tracking it.
III. ALLCONCUR: DESIGN SPECIFICATION
We use TLA+ [16] to provide a formal design specification of ALLCONCUR [23] . In addition to the number of servers n and the fault tolerance f ( II-A), we define S to be the set of servers and E the set of directed edges describing the overlay network; clearly, E ⊆ S × S . To define the digraph G (i.e., the overlay network), we use the Graphs module [16] : G is defined as a record whose node field is S and edge field is E . We assume that G's vertex-connectivity is larger than f .
We split the design of ALLCONCUR into three modules: (1) an atomic broadcast (AB) module; (2) a networking (NET) module; and (3) a failure detector (FD) module. Figure 2 illustrates the three modules together with the variables describing ALLCONCUR's state; moreover, the arrows indicate the flow of information, e.g., receiving a failure notification updates the set F [p], which leads to the update of the tracking digraphs in g[p] ( III-A). The AB module is the core of ALLCONCUR's design ( III-A). It exposes two interfaces at every server p ∈ S : the input interface Abcast(p), to A-broadcast a message; and the output interface Adeliver(p), to A-deliver all known A-broadcast messages. The AB module relies on the other two modules for interactions between servers: the NET module ( III-B) provides an interface for asynchronous message-based communication; and the FD module ( III-C) provides information about faulty servers [5] . indicates that the entire variable is modified. Also, p + (G) denotes the set of successors of p in G; m.o denotes the server that first sent message m; and m.t denotes the server targeted by a failure notification m, i.e., the failed server.
A. The atomic broadcast module
Let p ∈ S be any server. Then, the state of the AB module is described by the values of four variables (see [q] contains only q as node-p suspects that each message is only known by their owner. Also, p is initially non-faulty and it has neither A-broadcast its message nor terminated.
Next-state relations. The AB module defines six operators that specify all the possible state transitions (see Table I ). In addition to the two exposed interfaces, i.e., Abcast(p) and Adeliver(p), p can perform the following four actions: (1) receive a message, i.e., ReceiveMessage(p); (2) invoke the NET module for transmitting a message, i.e., TXMsg(p) ( III-B); (3) fail, i.e., Fail(p); and (4) invoke the FD module for detecting the failure of a predecessor q ∈ S , i.e., DetectFail(p, q) ( III-C).
The
.node; and it sets the ab[p] flag. Also, it sends p's message further by invoking the SendMsg operator of the NET module ( III-B). The main precondition of the operator is that p has not A-broadcast its message already; hence, a message can be A-broadcast at most once.
The Adeliver(p) operator sets the done[p] flag; as a result, p can A-deliver the messages in M [p] in a deterministic order. The main precondition of the operator is that all p's tracking digraphs are empty, i.e., g [p] [q].node = ∅, ∀q ∈ S . In Section IV, we show that this precondition is sufficient for safety.
The ReceiveMessage(p) operator invokes the DeliverMsg operator of the NET module; as a result, the least recent message from the recvBuf is stored into recvMsg ( III-B). ALLCONCUR distinguishes between A-broadcast messages and failure notifications. For both, the o field indicates the server that first sent the message, i.e., the owner; also, the t field of a failure notification indicates the server suspected to have failed, i.e., the target. , that contains m.t. Updating the tracking digraphs is the core of ALLCONCUR's early termination mechanism and we describe it in details in Section III-A1.
The Fail(p) operator clears the nf [p] flag. As a result, all of p's operators are disabled-ALLCONCUR assumes a fail-stop model. The main precondition of the operator is that less than f servers have already failed.
TXMsg(p) and DetectFail(p, q) are discussed in Section III-B and Section III-C, respectively. 1) Updating the tracking digraphs: Tracking digraphs are trivially updated when p adds an A-broadcast message to the set M [p] and, as a result, removes all the servers from the digraph used (by p) to track this message. Updating the tracking digraphs becomes more involved when p receives a failure notification. The first approach follows the algorithm described in the ALLCONCUR paper [25] ; yet, due to its recursive specification, it is not suitable for the TLA+ Proof System (TLAPS) [7] . The second approach constructs the tracking digraph from scratch, using the failure notifications from F [p]; yet, it requires the TLA+ Model Checker [16] 
Properties of tracking digraphs. From the recursive specification, we deduce the following four invariants that uniquely define a non-empty tracking digraph, denoted by TD(p, p * ): (I 1 ) it contains its root, i.e., p * ∈ TD(p, p * ).node; (I 2 ) it contains all the successors of every server (in the digraph) known to have failed, except those successors from which failure notifications were received, i.e.,
(I 3 ) it contains only edges that connect a server (in the digraph) known to have failed to all its successors, except those successors from which failure notifications were received, i.e.,
; (I 4 ) it contains only servers that are either the root or the successor of another server (in the digraph) known to have failed, except those successors from which failure notifications were received, i.e., ∀q ∈ TD(p, p * ).node : (q = p * ∨ (∃q p ∈ TD(p, p * ).node :
). The intuition behind invariant I 1 is straightforward-while tracking p * 's message, p always suspects p * to have it. Invariants I 2 and I 3 describe how a tracking digraph expands. The successors of any server q, which is both suspected to have m * and known to have failed, are suspected (by p) to have received m * directly from q before it failed. Yet, there is one exceptionsuccessors from which p already received notifications of q's failure. Receiving a notification of q's failure before receiving m * entails the sender of the notification could not have received m * directly from q (cf. Proposition 1). I 1 , I 2 and I 3 are necessary but not sufficient for a non-empty digraph to be a tracking digraph. As an example, we consider nine servers connected through a G S (9, 3) digraph [28] (see Figure 3a) . While p 6 is tracking m 0 , it receives two notification, one from p 4 indicating p 0 's failure and another from p 7 indicating p 2 's failure; i.e.,
Clearly, the digraphK 9 (p 6 ) illustrated in Figure 3b satisfies the first three invariants. Yet, there is not reason for p 6 to suspect that p 2 has m 0 .
For sufficiency, invariant I 4 is needed. Together with I 3 , I 4 requires that p suspects only those servers that are connected through failures to the root p * . In other words, for p to suspect a server q, there must be a sequence of servers starting with p * and ending with q such that every server preceding q is both known to have failed and suspected to have sent m * to the subsequent server. Note that a server is always connected through failures to itself. Figure 3c shows the actual digraph used by p 6 to track m 0 in the above example.
Second approach-TLAPS specification. We use the above invariants to provide a non-recursive specification of a nonempty tracking digraph. Let K n be a complete digraph with n nodes; clearly, K n satisfies I 1 and I 2 . LetK n (p) be a digraph obtained from K n by removing all edges not satisfying I 3 (see Figure 3b for nine servers connected through a G S (9, 3) digraph). Then, the set TD(p, p * ).node contains any node inK n (p) that is either p * or (according to p) is connected to p * through failures, i.e.,
where π p * ,q (K n (p)) is a path inK n (p) from p * to q. Note that when removing a node fromK n (p) we also remove all the edges incident on that node. Using TLAPS, we prove that this specification satisfies all four invariants [23] .
B. The networking module
The NET module specifies an interface for asynchronous message-based communication; the module assumes that servers communicate through an overlay network. The interface considers three constants: (1) S , the set of servers; (2) G, the digraph that describes the overlay network; and (3) Message, the set of existing messages. We assume that every message has a field o indicating the server that first sent it.
Let p ∈ S be any server. Then, the state of the NET module is described by the values of three variables (see Figure 2 ):
, is p's receiving buffer; and (3) recvMsg, is the latest received message. Note that while recvBuf [p] is a sequence of received messages, sendBuf [p] is a sequence of tuples, with each tuple consisting of a message and a sequence of destination servers. Also, both buffers act as FIFO queues. In the initial state, the buffers are empty sequences; the initial value of recvMsg is irrelevant.
Next-state relations. The NET module defines three operators that specify all the possible state transitions (see Table I ). The operators consists of the three main actions performed in message-based communication-sending, transmitting and delivering a message. To describe the three operators, let msgs be a sequence of messages and nf a mapping S → {0, 1} indicating the non-faulty servers.
The SendMsg(p, msgs, nf ) operator, updates sendBuf [p] by appending tuples consisting of messages from msgs with their destinations; for every message m, the set of destinations consist of p's non-faulty successors, except for m.o. Note that the SendMsg operator has no precondition.
The TXMsg(p) operator sends m, the next message from sendBuf [p], to q, one of m's destinations; m's sequence of destinations is updated by removing q; when there are no more destinations, m is removed from sendBuf [p]. Also, m is appended to recvBuf [q]. As a precondition, the send buffer of p must not be empty.
The DeliverMsg(p) operator updates recvBuf [p] by removing a message (i.e., the least-recent received) and storing it in recvMsg. Note that recvMsg is only a temporary variable used by the AB module to access the delivered message (i.e., the ReceiveMessage operator). As a precondition, the receive buffer of p must not be empty.
C. The failure detector module
The FD module provides information about faulty servers. It specifies a FD that guarantees both completeness and accuracy, i.e., a perfect FD [5] . The specification assumes a heartbeat-based FD with local detection: Every server sends heartbeats to its successors; once it fails, its successors detect the lack of heartbeats. The module considers two constants: (1) S , the set of servers; and (2) G, the digraph that describes the overlay network.
Let p ∈ S be any server. Then, the state of the FD module is described by the values of one variable (see Next-state relation. The FD module defines only one operator, DetectFail(p, q) , that specifies the state transition when p detects q's failure; i.e., the FD[p][q] flag is set (see Table I ). The operator has a set of preconditions. First, p must be both non-faulty and a successor of q. Second, q must be faulty, i.e., nf [q] = 0; this condition guarantees the accuracy property required by a perfect FD [5] .
Once a failure is detected, the AB module must be informed. The FD module invokes the NET module to append a notification of q's failure to recvBuf [p] (see Figure 2 ). This ensures that any A-broadcast messages sent by q to p that were already transmitted (i.e., added to recvBuf [p]) are delivered by p before its own notification of q's failure. Thus, Proposition 1 holds: If p receives from q s ∈ q + (G) a notification of q's failure, then q s has not received from q any message that p did not already receive. In the above scenario, q s = p.
D. Safety and liveness properties
Using the above specification, we define both safety and liveness properties. First, ALLCONCUR relies on a perfect FD for detecting faulty servers; hence, it guarantees both accuracy and completeness [5] . Accuracy is a safety property: It requires that no server is suspected to have failed before actually failing, i.e.,
Completeness is a liveness property: It requires that all failures are eventually detected, i.e.,
where X Y asserts that whenever X is true, Y is eventually true [16] . Second, any atomic broadcast algorithm must satisfy four properties-validity, agreement, integrity, and total order [11] , [5] . Integrity and total order are safety properties. Integrity requires for any message m, every non-faulty server to A-deliver m at most once, and only if m was previously A-broadcast by its owner q, i.e.,
Note that the requirement that a server A-delivers m at most once is ensured by construction, i.e., M [p] is a set.
Total order asserts that if two non-faulty servers p and q A-deliver messages m 1 and m 2 , then p A-delivers m 1 before m 2 , if and only if q A-delivers m 1 before m 2 . Since p A-delivered messages in M [p] in a deterministic order, we replace total order with set agreement: Let p and q be any two non-faulty servers, then, after termination,
Validity and agreement are liveness properties. Validity asserts that if a non-faulty server A-broadcasts a message, then it eventually A-delivers it, i.e.,
where X asserts that X is always true [16] ; also, a-deliver (p, q) = q ∈ M [p] ∧ done[p] = 1 asserts the conditions necessary for p to A-deliver the message A-broadcast by q. Agreement asserts that if a non-faulty server A-delivers a message A-broadcast by any server, then all non-faulty servers eventually also A-deliver the message.
To verify that all the above properties hold, we use the TLA+ Model Checker [16] , hence, the need for a tracking digraph specification that does not enumerate all paths of a digraph ( III-A1). For a small number of servers, e.g., n = 3, the model checker can do an exhaustive search of all reachable states. Yet, for larger values of n the exhaustive search becomes intractable.
As an alternative, we use the model checker to randomly generate state sequences that satisfy both the initial state and the next-state relations. In the model, we consider the overlay network is described by a G S (n, d) digraph [28] . When choosing G S (n, d)'s degree, i.e., its fault tolerance ( II-B), we require a reliability target of 6-nines; the reliability is estimated over a period of 24 hours according to the data from the TSUBAME2.5 system failure history [26] , [10] , i.e., server MTTF ≈ 2 years.
In addition, we use TLAPS to formally prove the safety properties-the FD's accuracy and the atomic broadcast's integrity and set agreement ( IV). TLAPS does not allow for liveness proofs. However, validity and agreement require ALLCONCUR to terminate; termination is informally proven in the ALLCONCUR paper [25] .
IV. ALLCONCUR: FORMAL PROOF OF SAFETY
Atomic broadcast has two safety properties-integrity and total order. In ALLCONCUR, total order can be replaced by set agreement ( III-D). In addition, ALLCONCUR relies on a perfect FD for information about faulty servers; thus, for safety, accuracy must also hold. For all three safety properties, we use TLAPS [16] to provide mechanically verifiable proofs [23] . All three proofs follow the same pattern: We consider each property to be an invariant that holds for the initial state and is preserved by the next-state relations.
Accuracy. The FD's accuracy is straightforward to prove. Initially, all flags in FD are cleared; hence, the property holds. Then, according to the specification of the DetectFail operator ( III-C), setting the flag FD[p][q] for ∀p, q ∈ S is preconditioned by q previously failing, i.e., nf [q] = 0. Moreover, due to the fail-stop assumption, a faulty server cannot become subsequently non-faulty. As a result, accuracy is preserved by the next-state relations.
Integrity. Integrity is also straightforward to prove. Initially, all the sets in M are empty; hence, the property holds. Then, the only two operators that update M are Abcast and RecvBCAST (see Table I 
A. Set agreement
The set agreement property is the essence of ALLCONCUR-it guarantees the total order of broadcast messages. Clearly, set agreement holds in the initial state, since all done flags are cleared. Moreover, the done flags are set only by the Adeliver operator (see Table I ); thus, we only need to prove set agreement is preserved by Adeliver. We follow the informal proof provided in the ALLCONCUR paper [25] . We introduce the following lemmas:
Lemma IV.1. Let p be a server that receives p * 's message m * ; then, there is a path (in G) from p * to p such that every server on the path has received m * from its predecessor on the path, i.e.,
Proof: Equation (2a) is straightforward. Equation (2b) ensures that every server on the path (except p * ) received m * from its predecessor. Any server q that received a failure notification from a server on the path (except p * ) targeting its predecessor on the path also received m * (cf. Proposition 1).
Lemma IV.2. Let p be a non-faulty server that does not receive p * 's message m * ; let π p * ,ai (G) = (a 1 , . . . , a i ) be a path (in G) on which a i receives m * ; let (a 1 , . . . , a i ) be also a path in
Proof: A necessary condition for p to terminate is to remove every server a j , ∀1 ≤ j ≤ i from g[p][p * ]. According to ALLCONCUR's specification ( III-A1), a server a j can be removed from g[p][p * ] in one of the following scenarios: (1)
[p * ]) entails at least the removal of an edge from the (a 1 , . . . , a j ) path. Let (a l , a l+1 ), 1 ≤ l < j be one of the removed edges. Then,
Lemma IV.3. Let p, q be two non-faulty servers such that
; let π p * ,p (G) = (a 1 , . . . , a λ ) be the path on which p receives m * ; let a k be a server on
Proof: We use mathematical induction: The basic case is given by invariant I 1 ( III-A1), a 1 = p * ∈ g[q][p * ].node. For the inductive step, we assume (a 1 , . . . , a i ) ∈ g[q][p * ] for some 1 ≤ i < k. Due to the FD's completeness property ( III-D), the failure of a j , ∀1 ≤ j ≤ i is eventually detected; due to the vertex-connectivity of G, q eventually receives the failure notification of every a j . Moreover, q cannot remove a j , ∀1 ≤ j ≤ i from g Theorem IV.4. ALLCONCUR's specification guarantees set agreement.
. Then, ∃π p * ,p = (a 1 , . . . , a λ ) on which m * first arrives at p (cf. Lemma IV.1). Let a k be a server on π p * ,p such that nf [a k ] = 1 and nf [a i ] = 0, ∀1 ≤ i < k; the existence of a k is given by the existence of p, a server that is both non-faulty and on π p * ,p . The path π p * ,p is illustrated in Figure 4 ; the faulty servers are indicated by The RTD invariant enables us to formally prove set agreement using TLAPS [23] . Clearly, when Adeliver(q) is enabled, a k (from the proof of Theorem IV.4) is in RTD(q, p * ), but not in g[q][p * ]. According to the initial assumptions, p * / ∈ M [q] and F [q][a k ] = ∅. Moreover, π p * ,a k = (a 1 , . . . , a k ) was at some point a path in g[q][p * ] (cf. Lemma IV.3); hence, π p * ,a k is also a path in RTD(p, p * ) (follows from RTD's construction), which contradicts the RTD invariant.
2) Proving the RTD invariant: To prove the RTD invariant, we follow the same pattern as before: We prove that the invariant holds for the initial state (since RTD(p, p * ) = g[p][p * ], ∀p, p * ) and is preserved by the only three operators that update the M , G or F variables-Abcast; RecvBCAST; RecvFAIL (see Table I ). In the following proofs, X denotes the updated value of a variable X after applying an operator [16] . , the only possibility for the RTD invariant to not be preserved by either operators is ∃π p * ,q (RTD(p, p * ) ). Let (e 1 , e 2 ) be one of the edges that enables such a path, i.e., (e 1 , e 2 ) / ∈ RTD(p, p * ).edge ∧ (e 1 , e 2 ) ∈ RTD(p, p * ) .edge. Theorem IV.6. The RecvFAIL operator preserves the RTD invariant.
